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SIR EDWARD'S EVIDENCE 



K'ynr.h 



SIR EDWARD'S EVIDENCE 

BY 

DR. EDMUND von MACH 

CAMBRIDGE, MASS. 



AN ADDRESS 

Delivered before the German University League 

New York, N.Y., April 24, 1015. 









Since the following address was delivered, 
Dr. Conybeare has, under date of June 30, 1915, 
in a short note published at his request in the 
London "Times", recanted his views on Sir 
E. Grey, quoted by Dr. Von Mach. However, 
the note did not add anything to Dr. Cony- 
beare's exhaustive analysis of the "evidence" 
contained in his earlier letter, published in the 
"Vital Issue" of April 17, 1915. 

GERMAN UNIVERSITY LEAGUE. 



SIR EDWARD'S EVIDENCE^ 

Part I 
Sir Edward's Speech in Parliament 

Dr. F. Cornwallis Conybeare, of L)xford University, wrote in his famous 
letter- these significant words ; 

In August and September and October I felt so sure tbat England had al! the right 
on her side and Germany all the wrong that I liardly troubled to read the diplomatic 
documents. 

Then a certain event made him hesitate and ask whether it was possible 
that England, or at least her leading man, Sir Edward Grey, might be in 
error. He studied the evidence, and as the result of his studies reached the 
conclusion that before long England would find Sir Edward Grey guilty of 
treason and send him to the gallows, for it was Grey's treasonable lies, he 
thought, that had rushed England into the war. 

How the English will choose to deal with Sir Edward Grey is their own 
afi'air, but it is the afl:'air of the whole world to enquire whether Dr. Cony- 
beare's conclusions concerning Sir Edward's reliability are correct. 

There can be no doubt that in America Sir Edward's evidence has been 
generally credited as true. Professor Samuel Harden Church. President of 
the Carnegie Institute, Pittsburgh, and author of The Life of Croiii-well. may 
be cited as a typical American, unwilling to form a rash judgment, and, 
therefore, eager to study the evidence. He has published his conclusions in a 
pamphlet called Reply to the German Professors, and says: 

We are all going deeper than the surface in our search for the truth. * * * 
In the English Jl'hitc Palmer we have all the telegrams which were exchanged between 
the English Foreign Office over the signature of Sir Edward Grey and the diplomatic 
officials of the other powers, including the Imperial Chancellor of Germany.* 

And speaking of the .\merican judgment. Professor Church says: 

That judgment is not based upon the lies and calumnies of the enemies of Germany, 
nor upon the careless publication contained in newspapers, but upon a profound study 
of the official correspondence in the case, * * * and the pubhc demand for this 
indisputable evidence has not yet been satistied.* 



^.-\n address delivered before the German University League. New York, on April 24, 1915. 
This address was printed as Chapters XXXI and XXXII of the author's "Germany's Point of View,*' 
McClurg & Co., Chicago, 1915, and is here reprinted with the permission of the publishers. 

-First published in the Vital Issue of April 17, 1915, and reprinted as Booklet No. 3, of the 
Vital Issue Booklets. The Vital Issue Co., Park Row Building, New York. 

'Ibid, p. 6, 



Professor Church, therefore, it will be seen, has placed implicit confidence 
in the completeness and honesty of Sir Edward's evidence. Nor is he alone 
in his belief. So keen an observer of America as Viscount Bryce was quoted 
in the Boston Herald of March 22, 1915, as follows: 

As to the general feeling in the United States, my correspondents entirely agree 
with what may be gathered from the leading American journals. The vast majority of 
the people condemn the German Government, laying the blame for the outbreak of the 
strife upon it and Austria. This they do not from racial sympathy with England nor 
from their traditional friendliness to France, but because their reading of the diplomatic 
correspondence in the first half of August convinced them that Germany zi'as the aggressor 
and put herself utterly in the wrong. 

Both \'iscount Bryce and Professor Church are right in explaining the 
pro-British attitude of many Americans by their study of the official docu- 
ments. The British Blue Book, first published as a White Paper, reads well. 
It did, therefore, not occur to the people that its trustworthiness was doubtful. 
For these reasons a soinewhat detailed investigation of Sir Edward's evidence 
is in place even at this late hour. 

Sir Edward delivered his great speech in Parliament on the evening of 
August 3, 1914. The speech, which was unsupported by documentary evidence 
— for the Blue Book was not issued until August 6 — was at once cabled to 
-America. It should have, and was believed to have, contained the salient 
points and facts, for England went to war on the information given by Sir 
Edward Grey on August 3, and was at war with Germany before the tele- 
grams were published. 

Nobody can, of course, expect a minister to include every despatch in a 
speech. But he has the right to assume that the minister has not suppressed 
such information as would have made his country keep the peace. Dr. 
Conybeare and many Englishmen believe that Sir Edward suppressed such 
»nformation, and that if he had divulged it peace would have been preserv-ed. 
Whatever view one wishes to take of this subject, the fact is established that 
Sir Edward's speech was accepted by many Americans and by most Englishmen 
as a fair and honorable statement of the facts. For this reason Dr. Cony- 
beare's letter is of great importance. 

But it is possible to go even farther than the Oxford scholar and charge 
Sir Edward not only with unfortunate omissions, but also with positive false- 
hood. He said in his speech {Blue Book, p. 134), 

We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have. 

When he said this he had not disclosed the information he had on the following 
important points : 

(1) The telegrams e.xchanged between the royal houses of London, Berlin 
and Petrograd, in which many people see the sincere efforts of the German 
Emperor to preserve peace; (2) the final ofifer of Germany made by the 
Gennan Ambassador, and published later as No. 123 of the Blue Book; (3) 
the full promise made to France, which has never been published by England, 
and seems to have been unknown even to Dr. Conybeare; (4) the British- 
Russian naval agreement, without which Russia would never have dared to 

4 



risk a war; (5) the "conversations" between the British and Belgian general 
staffs, which had given to England all the military secrets of Belgium, and 
in a war between Germany and England made it practically impossible for 
Belgium to remain a neutral outsider. 

The first of these omissions is sufficiently discussed by Dr. Conybeare. 
The second, however, grows more formidable when one compares Sir Edward's 
excuse why he did not mention the final liberal offer of Gennany with a 
message he sent to France. It will be remembered from Dr. Conybeare's letter 
that Sir Edward explained, when he was challenged in Parliament late in 
August, that he had thought the oft'er had been made unofficially by the 
German Ambassador, and not by Germany. Dr. Conybeare tried to prove the 
falsity of this excuse by innuendo, and has made a strong case. The whole 
matter, however, is clinched by Number 126 of the French Yellow Book* 
where the French Ambassador reports home his conversation with Sir Edward 
Grey concerning Germany's ofler. He writes under date of August 1 1914: 

Sir Edward Grey has told me that in the council this morning the Cabinet con- 
sidered afresh the situation. Germany having demanded from England a declaration 
of neutrality, and not having obtained it. the I'.ritisii Government remained master of 
its actions. 

There is not one word here of an "unofficial" offer. On the contrary, the 
friendly proposals are presented to France as a demand made by Germany. 

When Sir Edward, therefore, told Parliament that he had disclosed his 
information, although he had not mentioned this offer, he did not speak the 
truth. And when he later told Parliament that he had believed the offer to 
have been unofficial, he either told a falsehood to Parliament or he had told 
one to Paul Cambon on August 1, 1914. 

And even this is not all, for Sir Edward actually spoke as follows on 
August 3 (Blue Book. pp. 128, 129) : 

But I understand that the German Government would be prepared, if we would 
pledge ourselves to neutrality, to agree that its fleet would not attack the northern coast 
of France. I have only heard that shortly before I came to the House, but it is far 
too narrow an enagagement for us. 

He had heard it on August 1, and had heard much more, too, so that the 
last sentence is a deliberate falsehood. The German offer of August 1 reads 
{Blue Book. No. 123) : 

He [the German Ambassador] asked me whether if Germany gave a promise not to 
violate Belgium neutrality we would engage to remain neutral. * * * The Ambassador 
pressed me as to whether I could not formulate conditions on which we would remain 
neutral. He even suggested that the integrity of France and her colonies might be 
guaranteed. 

Under this liberal offer Sir Edward might have secured the neutrality of 
Belgium, the integrity of France and her colonies, and the German agreement 
not to attack the northern coast of France with her fleet, exactly as Germany 
had refrained from doing in 1870. In fact, he might have avoided the war. 
For France would have refused to support Russia, unless she had been sure 
of the support of England, and alone Russia would not have risked a war. 



*It is a strange fact that Dr. Conybeare has nowhere made use of the French )'c!!otv Bonk. 

5 



One also should remember that Sir Edward declined this German offer 
with the words, "I could only say that we must keep our hands free," and 
that when he said this he had twice before, on the preceding day and on this 
very day, pledged himself personally to the French Ambassador and promised 
to secure the support of the Cabinet for France. The dealings of Sir Edward 
Grey in this entire matter have been fully exposed in the discussion of the 
French Yellow Book.* 

The third point mentioned above as falsely stated in Sir Edward's speech 
of August 3 was the assurance which he said he had given to France. There 
is a discrepancy between the message he actually sent to France and the mes- 
sage he told Parliament the Cabinet had authorized him to send. The passage 
from the speech {Blue Book, p. 128) reads as follows: 

Yesterday afternoon I gave to the French Ambassador the following statement: 

I am authorized to give an assurance that if the German fleet comes into 
the channel or through the North Sea to undertake hostile operations against 
the French coasts or shipping, the British fleet will give all the protection in 
its power. This assurance is, of course, subject to the policy of His Majesty's 
Government receiving the support of Parliament, and must not be tal;cn as 
binding His Majesty's Government to take any action until tlie above contin- 
gency of action by the German fleet takes place. 

The message which the French Ambassador sent home on August 3 
(Vellozv Book, No. 143) reads as follows: 

Sir Edward Grey has authorized me to tell you that you may inform Parliament 
that to-day he made declarations in the Commons as to the present attitude of the British 
Government, and that the chief of these declarations was as follows : 

If the German fleet cross the Straits or go north in the North Sea in 
order to double the British Isles with a view to attacking the French coasts 
or the French navy, or to disturbing the French mercantile marine, the British 
fleet will intervene in order to give the French marine entire protection, so that 
from that moment on England and Germany would be in a state of war. 

Sir Edward Grey pointed out that the mention of operations through the North Sea 
implied protection against a demonstration in the Atlantic Ocean. 

The declaration with regard to the intervention of the British fleet, of which I 
gave you the te.xt in my telegram of .\ugust 2,* is to be regarded as binding the British 
Government. Sir Edward Grey assured me of this, and added that the French Govern- 
ment was therefore in a position to bring it to the knowledge of the Chambers. 

Who was in error? Did Sir Edward Grey give the above quoted message 
to the French Ambassador, or did he not? The French Prime Minister, M. 
Viviani, addressed the French Chambers on August 4 {Yellow Book, No. 159), 
and there repeated Sir Edward Grey's declaration ending with the words, "so 
that from that moment on England and Germany will be in a state of war!" 
and continued, "Froin now on, therefore, the British fleet covers our northern 
and western coasts." 

Such a public announcement, it would seem, could not have been made 
without contradiction by Sir Edward Grey if it had not been true. But if it was 
true, Sir Edward either did not tell Parliament the truth on August 3, or if he 
did, he had his speech revised for publication. In either case the American 
reader who has based his opinion at least in part on this speech must realize 
that he has budded on sand. 



*"Gerraany's Point of View," Chapters XVII. XVIII and XIX. 

*This declaration is substantially the same as that given by Sir Edward Grey as the only 
one he sent to France. 



He also should realize that Sir Edward uttered this threat of war before 
a single German soldier had entered Belgium. Germany has always claimed 
that the certainty of England's entrance into the war, and the knowledge of 
secret understandings between England. France and Belgium, forced her to 
anticipate her opponents or commit hari-kari. In Sir Edward's own publica- 
tions none of the documents which prove his firm determination to join France 
against Germany, whether Belgium was invaded or not, is printed. This 
explains the discrepancy between his published version and Viviani's public 
statement of the British message to France. 

The same reason induced Sir Edward Grey to keep from Parliament the 
naval agreement he had permitted to be made with Russia. There can no 
longer be any doubt that such an agreement exists. In the French Yellow 
Book this Russian naval agreement is spoken of as a fact, with the further 
comment that its existence had made the German Ambassador pessimistic 
concerning the future of his country. And in Russia the general text of the 
agreement had actually been published !* It had given Russia the conviction 
that in case of a conflict England would take her part and fight by her side. 

And even in America the conclusion of this British-Russian agreement had 
remained no secret. It was mentioned in the daily press, and Albert Shaw, 
editor of the American Reviciv of Reviezvs, wrote in June for publication in 
the July number of his magazine : 

The bitter feeling between Russia and Austria continues, if we may believe the 
tone of the press in these two countries, and the guarded though unmistakable utterances 
of Russian and Austrian public men. It is believed that Russia is intending to provoke 
a near casti-rn crisis. Reports are also rife that a secret naval convention has been 
concluded between England and Russia, with the object of enforcing the demands of the 
Triple Entente against Germany. 

Here not only mention is made of the Russo-English naval agreement, but 
a definite hint of the aggressive attitude of the Triple Entente is given. Sir 
Edward's evidence, however, is so arranged that the reader receives the 
impression that nothing had been further from the mind of England, Russia 
and France than aggressive ideas. What these ideas were, so far as Russia 
is concerned, is explained in the same number of the American Review of 
Reviews, which quotes the eminent Russian statesman. Professor Mitronov, of 
Moscow, as saying: 

Germany has pushed Russia out of the Balkans and put Austria across her path. 
For Russia, however, extension into the Balkans is a "political necessity," and nothing 
short of the possession of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles will end the intolerable 
situation. 

Knowing these wishes of Russia, Sir Edward Grey entered into a secret 
naval agreement with her, stiffened her backbone, and placidly saw her make 
her preparations for the war. The same number of the American Review of 
Reviezvs contains also this item : 

An evidence that Russia is preparing for some warlike movement on a large scale is 
furnished by a letter of a Tiflis correspondent appearing in a French newspaper. That 
part of the Russian Trans-Caucasus territory known as Georgia was the center of the 
revolutionary whirlwind of 1905-1906, toward the close of the Russo-Japanese war. It 
seems that the terrible repressive measures which were then taken to punish these 



*For the translation see ''Germany's Point of View," p. 44. 

7 



revolutionary sentiments are now to be repeated with even greater vigor in the same 
regions. It is a striking illustration of the ruthless methods of Russian militarism. 

If such and similar Russian measures, notably the Russian mobilization, 
were known to the Paris press, they were known also to Sir Edward Grey. 
There is, however, in all his documents not one despatch that gives the least 
hint that he tried to moderate the Russian aggressive spirit. On the contrary, 
he encouraged it, for nothing was so well calculated to stiffen the Russian 
military party than the knowledge of the people that England had at last been 
prevailed upon to commit herself, and had made a secret naval agreement with 
Russia. 

It is not claimed that this agreement was a formal treaty. It was a 
"gentlemen's agreement," just as the understanding with France had been 
based on nothing more than two letters exchanged between Sir Edward Grey 
and Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador. These Sir Edward was obliged to 
lay before Parliament on August 3, after he had repeatedly denied in the House 
of Commons that any understanding with France existed. This whole question 
of Sir Edward's quibbling with words and misinforming Parliament is fully 
treated by C. H. Norman in a pamphlet, Britain and the War: A Study in 
Diplomacy, London and Manchester, 1914. 

The French letters had been preceded and followed by exhaustive dis- 
cussions between the French and British military authorities. The same has 
been true of the Russo-English relations as appears from the Russian version 
of the naval agreement. If Sir Edward, therefore, said to Parliament, "We 
have disclosed the information which we have," without giving his under- 
standing with Russia, he conveyed to his hearers an impression which does not 
square with the facts. 

And what can finally be said of Sir Edward's lengthy discussion of the 
Belgian question in his speech of August 3, without informing Parliament of 
the fact that negotiations between the British and Belgian military authorities 
had been in progress for years, and that on the strength of such "conversations" 
England found herself in complete possession of the military secrets of Belgium, 
and had herself worked out a definite plan of throwing troops into Belgium? 
Some of the documents which prove the close relations that have existed for 
years between England and Belgium were discovered by the German Govern- 
ment in Brussels, and published in the North German Gazette, the German 
official paper, on October 12. Facsimile reproductions of two of these docu- 
ments appeared in the same paper on November 25. 1914. At first the pro- 
Allies press was tempted to doubt the genuineness of these documents, but on 
January 27, 1915, Sir Edward Grey inadvertently acknowledged their genuine- 
ness in trying to refute some of the charges against him that had been based 
on them. 

The question as to what extent these Anglo-Belgian conversations had 
impaired the standing of Belgium as a neutral country does not belong here.^ 
The important point in the appreciation of Sir Edward's trustworthiness is 



*For a full discussion see "Germany's Point of View." 



that lie discussed the Belgian question at length without referring to the Anglo- 
Belgian understanding, and yet had the courage to utter these words : "We 
have disclosed the issue, the information which we have." 

Quite recently and after waiting almost six months the Belgian Govern- 
ment has made a tardy defense against the charge that by entering into an 
Anglo-Belgian military understanding it had betrayed the Belgian people. The 
censorship is severe, but enough news has leaked through to make it probable 
that King Albert and his government will find it exceedingly difficult to con- 
vince the Belgians that they were not responsible for their sufferings, if the 
German publications are proved to be true. This explains King Albert's tardy 
defence which was issued on March 17. Cabled extracts appeared in the 
American press of the following day, while the full document was printed 
here on March 31, 1915. 

The Belgian defense is threefold: (1) The German allegations are a 
"tissue of lies" and their "facsimile" publications falsified; (2) the measures 
discussed in the documents were forced upon Belgium by the German danger; 
(3) the Belgian Government is entirely innocent of the charge of having taken 
the measures rendered necessary by the German danger and discussed in the 
documents. 

Let the reader in passing pay tribute to the magnificent logic of this 
defense, and then proceed to the investigation of the specific charge of dis- 
honesty made by the Belgian Government against Germany. It is thus stated : 

To produce an impression on those ignorant of the facts, "German honesty" 
suppressed, when the precis of the above-named conversation was published, the clause 
in which it was set forth that the exchange of opinion therein recorded had reference 
only to the situation that would be created if Belgian neutrality had already been violated. 

The Belgian Government gives to the allegations of the German Chancery the only 
answer that they deserve — they are a tissue of lies, all the more shameless because they 
are set forth by persons who claim to have studied the original documents. But what 
are the documents which Germany produces in order to prove Belgium guilty' They 
are two in number; (1), The narrative of certain interviews which took place between 
Lieutenant General Ducarne and Colonel Bernardston in 1906. In the course of these 
interviews the Brillsh officer set forth his views as to the way in which England could 
help Belgium in case the latter were attacked by Germany. One phrase in the document 
clearly proves that Colonel Bernardston is dealing with a hypothetical case, viz., "the 
entry of English troops into Belgium would only take place after a violation of Belgium 
neutrality by Germany.'" The translation in the Sorddeutsche Zcitung [the official 
Gazette] of November 25 omits this clause. 

When the Belgian Government made this charge they apparently believed 
that the German Official Gazette would not be available in the neutral countries, 
where it was hoped the charge would fall on fertile ground. The facts are 
as follows: The sentence appears fl) in the facsimile published by the 
Gazette (page 1). It is a marginal note and appears in exactly the same 
position in which it was written in the original ; (2) in the discussion of the 
text (page 2, column 4, lines 34 to 37), the following is written: 

In the document there is the following marginal note: L'entree dcs Anglais en 
Belgique ne se fcrait qtt'afrcs la violation de noire ncutralite t>ar V AUcmagne. 

When Dr. Bernhard Dernburg issued his publication of these documents 
he inserted the marginal note in the running text (page 4. column 1, paragraph 
5, lines 4 to 6). It may, however, well be asked whether the official Gazette 

9 



did not give greater prominence to this important sentence by devoting a 
paragraph to it at the end of the translation of the running text, than Dr. 
Dernburg did by inserting it in the text. 

The charge of dishonesty, therefore, made by the Belgian Government falls 
to the ground. And the same is true of the second charge which, in the Belgian 
defense, reads as follows : 

Moreover, the photograph of General Ducarne's report contains the words : "The 
officer with whom I spoke insists that our conversation has been absolutely confidential." 
For the word conversation the Xorddrufschc Zcitung substitutes the word "convention." 
Colonel Bernardston is made to say that "our convention" has been absolutely confidential ! 

Such proceedings need no commentary. 

The facts from the official Gazette are these: The facsimile reproduction 
of the letter (page 2. last word of line 1) is "conversation," and not "con- 
vention," as the Belgian charge would make one believe. In the translation 
(page 2, column 1, line 34) this is translated with Abkoiumen, which is per- 
haps most accurately rendered in English by "understanding." The translation 
into English is easy because both languages possess the word "conversation," 
and in both the meaning of the word may range from "desultory talk" to 
"tmderstanding." In German the case is different, for while a translator who 
is not afraid of using a foreign word might have said "Konversation." nine 
people out of ten would probably have rendered "conversation" here by 
Ahkominen. for the text implies that the two military representatives of Great 
Britain and Belgium had come to an understanding. 

The Belgian defense continues : 

The British Government has always held, as did the Belgian Government, that the 
consent of the latter was a necessary preliminary [to the entry of British troops into 
Belgium]. 

This assertion is flatly contradicted by the documents themselves, the second 
of which contains these words: 

Lieutenant-Colonel Bridges told the [Belgian] General that * * * at the time 
of the recent events the British Government would have immediately effected a disem- 
barkment in Belgium even if we had not asked for assistance. The General objected 
that for that our consent was necessary. 

The military attache [Lt.-Col. Bridges] answered that he knew this, but that — 
since we were not able to prevent the Germans from passing through our country, 
England would have landed her troops in Belgium anyhow [rn toui ctat dc cause]. 

Very interesting also are the remarks which Lord Roberts made in the 
British Review, of August, 1913, and which are here quoted from the Father- 
land, of March 17, 1915: 

I do not think the nation yet realizes how near it was to war as lately as August, 
1911. For many autumn nights our home fleet lay in Cromarty Firth with torpedo 
nettings down, with the gun crews sleeping on deck, with a live projectile ready in each 
gun, and with the war heads fitted to each and every torpedo. Our E.xpeditionary I^orce 
was held in equal readiness instantly to embark for Flanders to do its share in maintaining 
the balance of power in Europe. 

There is not a word here of asking the consent of Belgium. And what- 
ever the American press may say, no English officer can be found who can 
deny on his honor that it had not been known for years in British military 
circles that England would send her troops to Belgium in case of war, whether 

10 



Belgium wished this or no. After Belgium had given her military secrets to 
England, who knew the exact size of each garrison, the number of guns, how 
far they could shoot, where each place was vulnerable, how many troops could 
be fed in each village or town, where the Belgian troops would gather, how 
they planned to provision themselves, and so on, Belgium was no longer free 
to act as she chose. When she first discussed her military afifairs with Eng- 
land, she may have done so absolutely honestly and in fear of an invasion 
by Germany. When her Government permitted these "conversations" to go as 
far as they were carried under Sir Edward Grey's instructions this Govern- 
ment suddenly found itself entirely at the mercy of its new allies. 

The fiction has been kept up in the American press that Belgium is not 
one of the Allies, but a neutral for whose restoration the Allies are fighting. 
But even Mr. Bryan knows better, and in the famous interview he granted 
the Rev. D. MacFayden for the Westminster Gazette of December 23, 1914, 
he refers to Belgium as the ally* of England. 

And such Belgium undoubtedly is, and was even before the war began, for 
that intimate relations had been established between Sir Edward Grey and the 
Belgian Government is proved by the Brussels documents. 

Like the ambassadorial agreement with France, and the naval agreement 
with Russia, the Belgian understanding had remained secret. Parliament and 
the English people had no idea how far Sir Edward had committed them. 
One of these agreements — that with France — he was forced to disclose on 
August 3, and in choosing the French letters he gauged wisely the temper of 
his countrymen. He was equally wise in refraining from disclosing the other 
two, for an irate Parliament and surely an irate electorate would have swept 
him from the stage of politics. 

Wise reticence is an admirable quality, but to keep silent on several of 
the most important bits of information, and yet to say with the air of an 
honest man: "We have disclosed the issue, the information which we have" — - 
this is not admirable. 

P..\RT II 

Sir Edward's Published Documents 

So many people have read the British Blue Book and German White Paper 
and other official documents, who never before had even seen such publica- 
tions, let alone looked into them, that the ethical principles according to which 
state papers are edited were unknown to them. The pro-English press, more- 
over, and such writers as James M. Beck, have led them to believe that 



*The tone of this interview was so strongly anti-German and the reference to Belgium as the 
"ally" of England so important, if true, that the author wrote to IVTr. Bryan asking him to confirm 
or deny the accuracy of the interview. The following courteous reply was received; 

Department of State, Washington, D. C, December 29, 1914. 
My Dear Sir: 

For M'r. Bryan I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter of December 25, in which you ask 

permission to quote the purported interview with Rev. Donald MacFayden on December 7, as authentic. 

In reply I am directed to say that Reverend MacFayden called at the State Department. He 

has reported the conversation from memory. The Secretary has no doubt that Doctor MacFayden tried 

to be accurate, but he would not want to have his words taken as an exact statement of his views, 

I have the honor to he, sir, your obedient servant, 

(Signed) E. C. Sweet, 

Confidential Clerk- 
Mr, Edmund von Mach, 

48 Shepard Street, Cambridge, Mass. 

11 



governments are accustomed to publish in therr various white, blue, gray or 
orange papers the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. This, 
however, is nowhere done. 

There are many bits of information which come to a government through 
its diplomatic connections which it would be indelicate, discourteous or unwise 
to give to the public. The official documents on American foreign relations 
and all white, gray or orange papers are "edited." They are understood to be 
so by Congress, Parliament, the Reichstag, the Duma, etc., and no charge of 
dishonesty can be maintained against the respective governments on that score. 

This whole question has been so carefully treated in the Nerv York 
Times' Current History of the War (Vol. I, No. 3, p. 438 ff) that it is not 
necessary to repeat here the arguments and proofs there given. They were 
compiled as a reply to e.x-Assistant Attorney-General James M. Beck, whose 
article In the Supreme Court of Civilization has been reprinted in book form 
and won the approval of the Allies and pro-Allies press. Mr. Beck is a mem- 
ber of the law firm of Shearman & Sterling, and is upholding the pro- 
English traditions of this firm. During the Civil War, when the Union was 
suffering untold insults and damages at the hands of England, Shearman was 
the defender of his country's worst enemies, and the motto of the firm seems 
to have been ever since, "England, right or wrong. We are for England first, 
last and forever!" 

Since the reply to Mr. Beck in the New York Times was written, the 
French Yellozv Book has been published and other documents have come to 
light on the strength of which it is possible to prove the inaccuracy and incom- 
pleteness of Sir Edward's Blue Book in several particulars. A careful reading 
of the Blue Book itself, moreover, has revealed falsifications of such a serious 
character that they seem to be incompatible with the assumption of honesty 
on the part of its editor. 

The most glaring of all the omissions is Sir Edward's suppression of the 
dossier by which Austria explained her demarche against Servia. If these 
Austrian proofs had been in the hands of the members of Parliament when 
the Blue Book was distributed to them, and if they had been read by the 
American people, when they formed their impressions of the causes of the war 
by reading "the diplomatic correspondence in the first half of August," as 
Viscount Bryce says, an entirely dififerent impression might have been created. 
But be this as it may, nobody can defend Sir Edward's suppression of this 
important document. 

It was sent from Vienna on July 25, and presented both in Paris and in 
London on July 27. The French Yellow Book prints most* of it as received 
on that day, and calls it a "positive act of accusation against Servia." In it 
Austria sets forth her relations with Servia, and by documentary evidence and 
reports from the Senian press, including the ofl^cial Servian Government paper, 



•For the full text of the dossier see the .Austrian Ked Book. The Yellow Book does not 
print the several Annexes. In the absence of further proof it is impossible to state whether the 
Annexes are later additions, or whether the French Government failed to print the document in full. 

12 



tries to prove the complicity of the Servian Government in the murder of 
Serajevo. 

Sir Edward received the dossier on the same day, July 27, and in the 
first paragraph of No. 48 of his Blue Book gives a very insufficient summary 
of it, so worded that no reader would suspect that it was based on an ex- 
haustive presentation of Austria's grievances against Servia. Whatever force, 
moreover, remained in the emasculated summary is spoiled by Sir Edward's 
own commentary on it in the last paragraph. This is not a sportsmanlike 
procedure. Honesty demanded the publication of Austria's dossier, or if Sir 
Edward considered it too long, or an insufficient explanation of Austria's 
course, at least the mention that he had received what Austria believed to 
be a full proof of the justice of her contentions. 

As the suppression of the dossier is the most glaring omission from 
the British BJuc Book, so Number 105 contains the most glaring falsification. 
This is the famous despatch of Sir Edward Grey to his Ambassador in Paris, 
dated July 30, in which he enclosed as a proof of his assertion that Germany 
was assuming a threatening attitude toward France, a telegram from the 
French Minister of Foreign Affairs to Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador 
in London, dated July 31. The impossibility of enclosing a note of July 31, in 
one written on July 30, was so apparent that Sir Edward omitted the date, 
July 31, in the later issues of his documents.* But even the omission of this 
date did not make the note square with the facts. July 30 was Thursday. 
The enclosed note read : "The German army had its advance posts on our 
frontiers yesterday (Friday)." It was, therefore, necessary in the later editions 
to omit "Friday." But even this change did not suffice, because later on in 
the note, as first printed, these words occur : 

."Ml my information goes to show that the German preparations began on Saturday, 
the very day on which the Austrian note was handed in. 

This is another mistake, and to correct it Sir Edward Grey had recourse 
to a footnote in his later reprints. The footnote to "Saturday" reads: 

Sic: in original. The actual date of the presentation of the Austrian ultimatum 
was. in fact, Thursday, July 2i. The Servian reply was dated Saturday, July 25. and it 
is clearly to the latter document that reference is intended. 

This sounds honest. "Sic: in original!" Unfortunately for Sir Edward 
Grey the original despatch has been printed in the French Yellozv Book, 
Number 106, and a comparison of Sir Edward's version of the French 
despatch with the despatch itself reveals the remarkable fact that Sir Edward 
has rewritten the original, using the exact French words wherever possible, but 
interpolating new ones whenever his several alterations made this necessary. 
To make the despatch stronger. Sir Edward began it with a sentence of the 
last paragraph, which reads : 

The German army's advance posts are at our frontier posts. 

and to make it more definite he added a date. The original French despatch 
is dated July 30. Sir Edward had it rewritten for presentation to the Cabinet 



"For a full discussion of these dates, see the author's chapter in Why Eurof'e Is at War, G. P. 
Putnam's Sons, 1915. The New York Times reprint of the English documents ^ves the first version; 
the so-called Blue Book, issued in London Foreign Office, Septemher 28, 1914, gives the latter version. 

13 



meeting on July 31. and possibly showed it to his colleagues as having just 
been received. On July 31 he may have felt at liberty to add to the French 
statement "yesterday," or since the Cabinet meeting was on Friday to keep 
the French sentence, which is written in the present tense, and to add Friday 
in parenthesis. Whatever explanation is given one thing is sure. Sir Edward's 
first publication of the French despatch is as impossible as the second. The 
French note contained neither "yesterday" nor "Friday," and was written 
in the present tense. The English "translation" interpolated a date and changed 
the present to the past tense "had." 

And more ! The French note actually contains two references to "Satur- 
day," to which Sir Edward felt obliged to add his footnote. They read : 

The preparation in the fortresses (the cutting of wood, mounting of guns, con- 
struction of batteries, strengthening of wire entanglements) had already started* in 
Germany on Saturday, the 25th. * * * The stations were occupied in Germany on 
Saturday, the 25th. 

In both cases "the 25th" is added to Saturday, and as appears from the 
note, no measures of mobilization are spoken of, merely a rearrangement of 
the troops on regular peace footing, and those protective measures which any 
commandant of a frontier fortress might deem it necessary to take. Sir 
Edward took the first passage as serving his purposes best, altered the singular 
"preparation" to the plural, and by omitting the words which explain what 
preparations are meant, gave the impression that the note had reference to 
steps generally referred to as mobilization. He wished to convey the nnpres- 
sion that Gennany and Austria had used the Serajevo murder as a pretext for 
an aggressive war, and therefore substituted for "the 25th" the words "the 
very day on which the Austrian note was handed in." In this he made a 
mistake, and since this sentence had been printed in his first edition, had to 
have recourse to a footnote. 

It is not necessary to discuss Sir Edward's falsification of this note further. 
Those who wish to ascertain the truth can compare the English version with 
the French original. They will then see for themselves which passages Sir 
Edward felt obliged to omit, and why, and what changes he made in the 
original sentences he used. One change is rather noteworthy. Sir Edward's 
version speaks of the "pacific intentions" of France, while the French original 
says that "France is resolute." 

Those who read the whole French note and may gather from it the im- 
pression that France really believed Germany was taking aggressive military 
measures on July 30, and had done so for several days, are reminded that on 
the same day, July 30, X'iviani, the French Premier, had telegraphed to his 
ambassador in Petrograd instructions to urge Sazonof to "take no immediate 
steps which might ofifer to Germany a pretext for the total or partial mobiliza- 
tion of her forces." (Yellozv Book, Number 101.) Such a despatch would 
have been nonsense if Viviani had not known that Germany had not yet pro- 
ceeded even to a partial mobilization of her forces. A copy of this despatch 



*This is quoted from the New York Times translation. The French original is as accurately 
translated with "begun" as with "started." 

14 



was sent to Paul Cambon, the French Ambassador in London, and unless one 
wishes to assume that he wilfully kept this information from Sir Edward Grey 
— which, considering the close relations of these men is incredible — Sir Edward 
Grey knew that Germany had not even partially mobilized when he presented 
his falsified version of the French note to the Cabinet on Friday, July 31. 

That Sir Edward is not above insinuating false impressions is proved also 
by the internal evidence of his own Blue Book. The carefully prepared edition 
of September 28, 1914, contains an "Introductory Narrative of Events." On 
page IX Sir Edward writes : 

Sir Edward Grey telegraphed to Berlin once more. "Mediation," he said, "was 
ready to come into operation by any method that Germany thought possible, if only 
Germany would press the button in the interest of peace." The telegram was despatched 
at about 4 o'clock on the evenin.g of the 29th. 

This appeal was followed almost immediately by a strange response. About mid- 
night a telegram arrived at the Foreign Office from His Majesty's Ambassador at BerHn. 
The German Cliancellor had sent for him late at night. He had asked if Great Britain 
would promise to remain neutral in a war. provided Germany did not touch Holland 
and took nothing from France but her colonies. 

Turning to the despatches themselves. Sir Edward's offer of mediation is 
contained in Number 84, while the next number contains the enquiry froin 
the German Chancellor. By an oversight, however, the last paragraph of 
this despatch has not been omitted, and proves that Number 85 is not a 
response to Number 84. The nearest approach to a reply to Number 84 
contained in the Blue Book is Number 107, received in London on July 31. 
When Sir Edward, therefore, called Number 85 a response to Number S4. and 
printed the two despatches in juxtaposition to bear out his statement, he was 
guilty of one of those deceptions which honorable men despise. 

On page \'II of his "Introductory Narrative of Events," Sir Edward 
writes : 

On the 2,W July the .Austrian .Ambassador told Sir E. Grey that an ultimatum was 
being lianded to Servia. For the first time Sir E. Grey heard "that there would be 
something in the nature of a time limit." 

This statement is not true, unless one wishes to assume that the British 
sources of information were less than those of the French, and that the 
French Government intentionally kept Sir Edward in the dark. The French 
Government was informed by its Ambassador in Vienna on July 20 ( Yclloiv 
Book. Number 14) that. 

The shifts by which Servia will no doubt wish to delay a direct and clear reply 
have been taken into account, and that is why a brief delay will be fi.xed for her to 
notify her acceptance or her refusal. 

This means that France knew on July 20 that the note to Servia would 
contain a time limit. And yet Sir Edward writes that he first heard of it 
when the note was presented on July 23 ! 

He also studiously refrains froin stating in his Blue Book that the Servian 
Minister in Berlin had declared on July 20 (French Vclloiv Book. Number 15) 
that. 

This Government was ready to listen to the request of Austria arising out of the 
Serajevo outrage, provided that she did not demand judiciary co-operation. 

15 



Austria apparently had intended to ask this, but on the request of 
Germany dropped it and asked only for participation in the investigation. 

Nobody needs ask why Sir Edward suppressed this information. It was 
his intention to present Germany as bound to have war, and unwilling to exert 
any moderating influence on Austria. Sir Edward, therefore, suppressed all 
information tending to show that Germany had done everything possible from 
the very beginning to preserve the peace of Europe. The several efforts in 
this direction made by Germany appear from the study of the French YcUoiv 
Book. (See "Germany's Point of View," Chapters XV^II, XYIII and XIX.) 

Only one other despatch from the French Yellow Book should be men- 
tioned because it is of incalculable importance for the understanding of the 
causes of the war, and because Sir Edward Grey, who must have known its 
bearing, has not referred to the information it contained, either in his 
"Introductory Narrative" or in any of his despatches. It is a note {Yellow 
Book, Number 27, July 24, 1914) from the French Acting Minister of Foreign 
Affairs to his plenipotentiaries in Stockholm, Belgrade, London, Fetrograd, 
Berlin and Rome and contains the information sent him by the French 
Ambassador in Vienna. According to this the Ser^'ian Minister in Austria 
acknowledged the guilt of Servians in the murder of Serajevo, and the existence 
of an anti-Servian propaganda in Servia ! 

Whatever one may think of Sir Edward's honesty, his consistency is 
admirable, for with unerring precision he has omitted from his Blue Book 
every information which tended to show that Servia was guilty on the 
evidence of her own ministers {Yellow Book. Number 27) or of Austria's 
exhaustive dossier {Yelloiv Book, Number 75); that Servia was at first will- 
ing to accept Austria's modified ultimatum {Yellotv Book, Number 15); that 
Germany exerted a moderating influence on Austria (see "Germany's Point 
of View," page 255) ; in short, every bit of information which did not fit into 
his nicely arranged case that Germany had planned the war and that an 
innocent Servia had to serve as a pretext. 

Omission and falsification are written large over this chapter of Sir 
Edward's evidence ; and when the passions have cooled and scholars study his 
documents, he will not escape the judgment which overtakes all who by false 
evidence try to prove a case. 

Some despatches are included in the British Blue Book for which Sir 
Edward Grey may not have been personally responsible, but whose variance 
with the true facts detracts from the credibility of his evidence. 

On July 30 Sir G. Buchanan, the British Ambassador at Petrograd, 
reported two inten'iews he had had, in company with the French Ambas- 
sador, with the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Sazonof ( British 
Blue Book, Number 97). The French Ambassador sent reports to his home 
office of the same interviews. {Yelloiv Book, Numbers 102 and 103.) There 
is no reason whatsoever to believe that the French Ambassador or his home 
office altered what Sazonof had told them, for nobody will suspect the French 

16 



of falsifying despatches in the interest of Germany. The notes are too long 
to be reprinted in full, but a few passages deserve to be placed side by side: 

BRITISH NO. 97 FRENCH NO. 102 

M. Sazonof, whom I have informed of 
your desire to see avoided any military 
measure that might give Germany a pre- 
text for general mobilization [Note: his 

!r\ ■it^\i instructions read "total or partial mobili- 

ILnnittedl .. .,, r j »i » • A i 

zation ], replied that m the course ot 

last night the General Staff had sus- 
pended the e.xecution of some precaution- 
ary military measures, so as to avoid any 
misunderstanding. * * * On the other 
M. Sazonof told us that absolute proof hand, the Russian General Staff and Ad- 

was in possession of Russian Government miralty have received alarming informa- 

that Germany was making military and tion as to tlie preparation of the German 

naval preparations against Russia. Army and Xavy. 

It will be noticed that Sir G. Buchanan omits all reference to the sus- 
pension of the Russian inobilization, which was designed to prevent Germany 
from taking any military steps on her part. Such an admission would not have 
squared with Sir Edward's evidence, according to which Germany had begun 
her preparations days before. 

In the second paragraph the Russian "alarming information" has been 
turned by Sir G. Buchanan into "absolute proof." It is well known that 
Germany did not order mobilization until August 1, as of August 2. While, 
therefore, some unreliable and alarming information might have come to 
Sazonof, he could not possibly have spoken of "absolute proof." 

The discrepancies between the French and English accounts of the second 
interview are even more astonishing, and show Sir G. Buchanan's or Sir 
Edward's animus toward Germany. M. Sazonof had repeated to the two 
ambassadors his interview with the German Ambassador. 



BRITISH NO. 97, SECOND PART 

German ambassador had a second in- 
terview with Minister of Foreign Affairs 
at 2 a. m., when former completely broke 
down on seeing that war was inevitable. 

[The reference to Russia's mobilization 
is omitted.] 

He appealed to M. Sazonof to make 
some suggestion which he could telegraph 
to German Government as a last hope. 
M. Sazonof accordingly drew up and 
handed to German Ambassador a formula 
in French, of which following is trans- 
lation : 

"If Austria, recognizing that the con- 
flict with Servia has assumed character 
of question of European interest, declares 
herself ready to eliminate from her ulti- 
matum points which violate principle of 
sovereignty of Servia, Russia engages to 
stop all military preparations." 

Preparations for general mobilization 
will be proceeded with if this proposal 
is rejected by Austria, and inevitable re- 
sult will be a European war. Excitement 
here has reached such a pitch that if 
.\ustria refuses to make a concession, 
Russia cannot hold back, and now that 



FRENCH NO. 103 
The German ambassador called to-night 
upon M. Sazonof to urge again, but in 
less categorical terms, that Russia should 
cease her military preparations, affirm- 
ing that Austria would do nothing against 
the territorial integrity of Servia. 



[The same] 



Count de Pourtales promised to urge 
this proposal on his Government. In M. 
Sazonof's opinion the acceptance of his 
proposal by Austria will have as a 
logical consequence the opening of a de- 
liberation of the powers in London. 



17 



she knows that Germany is arming [Note: 
this was written on the same day on 
which Viviani said that Germany had not 
even begun partial mobiHzation] she can 
hardly postpone for strategical reasons, 
converting partial into general mobiliza- 
tion. 

According to the French version, Sazonof was counting with the possibihty 
of a peaceful solution, while Buchanan quotes him as practically ready for 
war. Why this discrepancy ? And why, it may be asked, did Austria not 
seize this opportunity and by accepting Sazonof's offer stop the Russian 
mobilization? 

The answer adds another black mark to Sir Edward's diplomacy, for at 
the request of his Ambassador at Petrograd, Sazonof withdrew his offer, 
substituting for it one which was impossible of acceptance. This is perhaps 
the most serious charge that can be made against Sir Edward, but it is fully 
substantiated. 

Sazonof had made his offer late on July 30, or more properly in the 

night of July 30-31, at the immediate request of the German Ambassador and 

without consultation with the British and French Ambassadors. On the next 

day, July 31, the French Ambassador reported to Paris (Yelloiu Book, 

Number 113): 

M. Sazonof informs me that he has modified his formula, at the request of the 
British Ambassador, as follows; 

Then he transmits Sazonof's new formula, which makes greater demands 
on Austria, the chief of which is that Austria "stay the advance of her 
troops on Servian territorj'," and instead of promising that Russia would 
"stop all military preparations." ends with the ambiguous phrase: "Russia 
undertakes to maintain her waiting attitude." Since Russia at that time had 
been vigorously mobilizing for some time, and at least since July 25, according 
to the Czar's own telegram, maintaining "her waiting attitude" cannot mean 
stopping "all military preparations." 

Sir Edward cannot claim that his Ambassador had acted de sua, and 

contrary to Sir Edward's wishes, for on the same day, July 31, he himself 

writes to Buchanan (British Blue Book, Number 110*): 

The German Ambassador asked me to urge the Russian Government to show good- 
will in the discussions and to suspend their military preparations. * * * j informed 
the German Ambassador that, as regards military preparations, I did not see how Russia 
could be urged to suspend them, unless some limit were put by Austria to the advance 
of her troops in Servia. 

Sir Edward's wishes, therefore, were carried out when Sazonof altered his 
formula at the request of Sir G. Buchanan. The impression is conveyed that 
Austria and Germany refused to consider Sazonof's offer, when, as a matter 
of fact, the British diplomats themselves requested and obtained its withdrawal. 

Sir Edward Grey has not yet explained Buchanan's and his own actions 
in this matter, but until he explains them, the only possible inference is that 
Sir Edward Grey did not want Russia to make a proposal to Austria and 
Germany that they were likely to accept. In short Sir Edward wanted war! 



*See also Blue Book, Number 103. 

18 



He wanted war, because he had prepared for it, and because he had begun 
his mobilization weeks before, certainly as early as the end of June. His 
Blue Book begins with July 20, but this is only a feint, as is proved by the 
following affidavit in the possession of the author: 

In a speech before the Boston Press Club on Sunday, January 14, Forbes Sutherland 
made the following statements : 

That for several years he had been a member of the British military intelligence 
department. 

That he landed in New York toward the end of June and he there found a cable- 
gram from the home office in London, already three days old, telling him to report 
immediately. 

That he telephoned to his local chief in Montreal, Canada, to inquire what it was 
all about, and that he was told that it was for the European service. 

That he had returned to London and that about one week before the first declara- 
tion of war he had gone to Antwerp with one of the heads of the intelligence depart- 
ment to concert measures with the head of the Belgium secret service. 

That he was now in this country overseeing the shipment of horses for the 
British army. 

This affidavit was published in the Fatherland, April 14, 1915, and since 
Mr. Sutherland was then employed by a prominent New England paper as 
military expert, the editor of this paper complained of the publication, but 
had to confess that the affidavit was correct when the author offered to publish 
a correction if it had been wrong. 

Why did Sir Edward recall Mr. Sutherland in June and send him to 
Antwerp, on his arrival in London, "to concert measures with the head of 
the Belgium Secret Service?" How does this square with the studied impres- 
sion conveyed by his Blue Book that he had no thought of war before July 20, 
and took no active steps until days later? 

Another affidavit in the possession of the author reads as follows : 

In Viersen, Germany, is a very large concern which has over 2,000 retail stores in 
Germany dealing in coffee. The name is Kaiser's Kaffee Gcschaeft. The main stock- 
holder's name, who is also the president of the company, is Commerzienrat Joseph Kaiser. 
This company has coffee plantations in Brazil, and on July 22 the home office cabled a 
large amount of money to their Brazil office via London. England attached this amount 
and did not forward same to Brazil. 

Again one wonders why England should have taken this action on July 22, 
a day before the Austrian note was presented to Servia, if Sir Edward had 
no intention of bringing about an European war. Similar instances have been 
collected in large numbers and will undoubtedly be edited soon and presented 
as a strong indictment of Sir Edward Grey. He will be forced to explain 
them — which he has refused to do as yet — or stand convicted either of 
having treacherously plotted the war, or having falsified his evidence. The 
present discussion is concerned with Sir Edward's published evidence and 
may, therefore, disregard the other information except in so far as it forms 
a background against which the published evidence may be surveyed. 

The British Blue Book is remarkably silent on the subject of British 

mobilization. The first reference to the British fleet occurs in Number 48, 

July 27, where Sir Edward quotes his interview with the Austrian Ambassador 

as follows : 

_ I pointed out that our fleet was to have dispersed to-day, but we had felt unable to 
let it disperse. We should not think of calling up reserves at this moment, and there 
was no menace in what we had done about our fleet. 

This statement is a falsehood, for the fleet was to have dispersed three 
days earlier, but had been kept mobilized by Winston Churchill, First Lord of 

19 



the Admiralty, without the knowledge or consent of the Cabinet.* This is to-day 
an acknowledged fact, and appears also from a despatch in the French Yellow 
Book, Number 66, which reads in part as follows : 

The attitude of Great Britain is defined by the stoppage of the demobiHzation of 
her fleet. The first Lord of the .Admiralty on Friday already [that is July 24] discreetly 
took this step on his own initiative. To-night Sir Edward Grey and his colleagues 
decided to publish this news. The result is due to the conciliatory attitude of Servia 
and Russia. 

The effect of this announcement, as is generally known, was to stiffen 
the military party of Russia, who saw in it the proof of England's intention 
to live up to the demands of her recently concluded naval agreement with 
Russia. The trustworthiness of Sir Edward's evidence, however, can be gauged 
by the fact that he writes over his own name as having taken place on July 27 
what actually took place three days earlier, on July 24. 

The mobilization of the British fleet could not be kept a secret long, and 

even if there had been no ulterior motive in publishing it, it would have had 

to be announced soon after it had taken place. It was not so with the 

mobilization of the land forces, and readers of the Blue Book have received 

the impression that no steps had been taken in advance of the outbreak of 

hostilities. This is due to Sir Edward's studious omission of all references to 

this subject. The French Yellow Book is less reticent, and in Number 108, 

July 30, Paul Cambon reports what Sir Edward had told him of his interview 

with the German Ambassador : 

But my German colleague questioned the Secretary of State for foreign affairs as 
to the military preparations of England. Sir Edward Grey replied that they had no 
offensive character, but that in the present state of affairs on the continent it was natural 
to take some precautions. 

This interview has been suppressed in Sir Edward's evidence ! 

But it is needless to pursue the investigation further. Those who have 
followed it may or may not agree with Dr. Conybeare of Oxford that Sir 
Edward Grey is "a sinister liar who forever has peace on his lips and war in 
his heart," but they cannot deny that Sir Edward's evidence is tainted with 
falsifications and omissions. 

It was, however, largely on Sir Edward's evidence that Germany was 
condemned in this and other neutral countries. From this very evidence it 
now appears, when it is corrected and supplemented, that Germany and 
Austria, far from plotting an European war, were slowly but surely pushed 
into it by Sir Edward Grey. He tried to cover up his tracks, and, barring a 
few slips in his Blue Book, might have succeeded if it had not been for the 
publication of the voluminous French Yellow Book. Taking these two pub- 
lications together and reading them against the background of history, there 
is no doubt that the present war is the result of a gigantic conspiracy against 
Germany. 



*See also letter by Admiral Lord Fisher to Sir Henry Lucy, published in New York Et'ening 
Sun and Milwaukee Free Press. April 19. 1915. "T am in close touch with Winston (Churchill). 
He has been splendid for three thinijs. First, the appointment to the command of the fleet of Jellicoe. 
Second, mobilizing before war was declared. Third, buying (fhis is euphemistic for seising, E. v. M.) 
the two Turkish dreadnoughts. • * • Mobilization of the fleet before the war upon the innocent 
pretext of an expected visit from the king, was a clever strategy that found the grand fleet oppor- 
tunely in the North Sea when, a few days later, war was declared, with the result of bottling up 
the German fleet in the helpless condition in which it remains to this day." 

It will be remembered that Sir Edward Grey has said that only he prepares for war who 
plans war. 

20 



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